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Financing Revolution: Sun Yat-sen and
the Overthrow of the Ch'ing Dynasty
O N DECEMBER 13, 1903, Sun Yat-sen (fig. 1), the father of the Chi-
nese revolution, sat patiently as he was being introduced. Dressed
in a light linen suit, he looked out across the overflow audience in
the Chinese theater on Hotel Street in downtown Honolulu. He
felt very much at home in Honolulu, and as he rose to address his
audience, thunderous applause filled the crowded theater. He
waited for silence and then, in his careful and calm manner,
launched into the subject that had been his passion and profession
for the previous decade.
"In revolution," he said, "we have a safety valve for the Chi-
nese people. It is the only means we have to redress our wrongs."
He approached the topic historically, pointing out that the Man-
chus were foreigners who had usurped power from the Chinese
people. Methodically, he outlined numerous wrongs committed
by the Manchus. Since the beginning of the Ch'ing dynasty in
1644, when the Chinese people were systematically slaughtered,
the Manchus had suppressed the Chinese and had continually
mismanaged the government so that China had now become a
weak nation.
Sun keyed in on the humiliation of the Boxer Insurrection
(1900-1903), pointing out that just 20,000 allied army troops were
able to capture Peking, the national capital boasting 400,000
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thousand people. "If such an army of foreign soldiers could cap-
ture the capital, what would happen if the Chinese people rose in
their might?"
He paused to let the audience reflect on this statement. They
answered enthusiastically, once again filling the auditorium with
applause.
Judging that the moment was right, Sun changed the focus of
his address. He had not come to Honolulu merely to induce revo-
lutionary fervor, but also to garner support for his revolutionary
party. Speaking forcefully and with emotion, Sun stressed that if
the Ch'ing dynasty was to be destroyed and a republic built on its
ruins, money was desperately needed. He urged them all to give
what they could, promising in return "a good government" that
Chinese could be proud of.l
This meeting was typical for Sun. As the "father" of the revo-
lution in the traditional Chinese sense of the word, he was respon-
sible for the support of his revolutionary family. Foremost among
his paternal duties was the acquisition of money for the revolu-
tion.
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From 1894 to 1911, Sun traveled around the globe advocating
revolution and soliciting funds for the cause. At first, he concen-
trated on China, but his continued need for money forced him
elsewhere. Southeast Asia, Japan, Hawai'i, Canada, the United
States, and Europe all became familiar during his endless quest.
In this process, he developed advanced and imaginative methods
for raising money. These fund-raising schemes reveal much about
Sun and so warrant a close examination. But it must not be for-
gotten that the money was not an end in itself: it was but the
means to overthrow the Ch'ing dynasty. Even though fund rais-
ing was Sun's principal occupation, to separate the financial Sun
from the political Sun is to understand neither.
IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Sun Yat-sen was born in Kwangtung Province on November 12,
1866. His traditional Chinese education was interrupted in 1879,
when he left China to join his older brother in Hawai'i. This was
the beginning of a long association with the West. His ability to
adapt to Western culture and the influence it had upon him soon
became apparent.
Sun entered Iolani School, a Christian institution in Honolulu,
and studied there for three years. He was an exceptional student
and upon graduation was awarded second prize for English gram-
mar. But English was not all Sun learned during these years at
Iolani, an Anglican school with a predominantly British faculty.
Daily prayer and weekly church services were required of all stu-
dents, and Sun even studied Christian literature. Furthermore, in
the classroom and in everyday life, Sun was exposed to the princi-
ples of democratic thought, including freedom, equality, and jus-
tice.2 These ideas had become firmly ingrained in Sun's con-
sciousness by the time his brother sent him back to China in 1883.
Western influence did not blend well with the traditions of
Sun's home village. His Christian education had taught him the
sacrilege of idolatry, and though the story is told with many varia-
tions, it is certain that he defaced some idols in the local temple.
News of the "little foreign devil" spread quickly throughout the
village, and much of the town converged on the temple to witness
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this horrible act of defiance.3 The community feared that the gods
would retaliate and, in an effort to appease them, expelled Sun
from the village.4
In many ways, this could be cited as the beginning of the revo-
lution, and Sun himself later made this claim.5 Rejected from his
home and holding values that alienated him from his country, Sun
was searching for a purpose. In 1884, he was baptized a Christian,
and at one point he desired to be a minister.6 Instead, he entered
medical school in Hong Kong in 1887. Surrounded by other bright
young Chinese, Sun's very real revolutionary tendencies sur-
faced.
Often at night, after classes, Sun would get together with other
students and exchange political ideas. Soon a core group of radi-
cals developed and formed a study group in which they discussed
revolution. Sun and his associates took their discussions seriously
and were labeled "The Four Big Outlaws." Their activities
extended beyond talk of revolution, for they even experimented
with explosives. Working secretly in the medical college labora-
tory, Sun was able to make a bomb. The four young revolutiona-
ries were delighted when it exploded on a Hong Kong street.7
Most of Sun's time at the medical college was spent in study,
though not all of it on medicine. With a tutor, he studied the Chi-
nese classics and history, as well. He also read other works, and it
is reported that two books in particular strongly influenced him: a
history of the French revolution and Charles Darwin's book on
evolution.8 He did not neglect his study of medicine, however,
and was graduated at the top of his class in 1892.9
Much of Sun's later success undoubtedly stemmed from his
personality, and in this he was something of an anomaly as a revo-
lutionary leader. His integrity and personal sense of decency
inspired those same qualities in others. In his rise to power, he
offended few, and in his wake, he left many who admired and
respected him. A small man of slight build, he nevertheless
exuded a sense of strength and integrity. He developed a reputa-
tion as a leader who was dedicated, honorable, and scrupulous.
His energy for the cause was endless, and he evidently had the
ability to persuade others, as there are numerous accounts of his
turning a crowd riddled with apathy into owners of revolutionary
bonds.
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For a short time after his graduation from medical school, Sun
led the life of a doctor, but he never abandoned his radical
stance.10 While in Canton, he developed a series of proposals he
believed would save China. In 1894, he traveled north to Tientsin
to present his plan to Li Hung-chang, one of the most powerful
officials of the Ch'ing government and a leader of China's self-
strengthening movement. Li was not interested in Sun's sugges-
tions, and the dejected Sun returned to Canton, not to resume the
practice of medicine but to begin a plan for a revolution to save
China.11 Later that year, he returned to Hawai'i.
Sun's first organized effort to build a sound base for revolution
began with the formation of the Hsing-chung-hui (Revive China
Society) in Honolulu on November 24, 1894. Beginning with a
dozen members, Sun raised $2,000 by assessing dues of $5 per
member and by soliciting gifts. This sum was increased by Sun's
brother, Sun Mei, who contributed the proceeds of sales of land
and cattle.12
With this money, Sun instigated an uprising in Canton in
October 1895.13 This revolt failed, however, resulting in the execu-
tion of many of Sun's supporters, and Sun himself narrowly
escaped to Hong Kong and then to Japan. Banned from China,
Sun found himself declared an enemy of his country with a price
on his head.14
After spending six months in Hawai'i at the beginning of 1896,
Sun traveled to London, where, in October, he was kidnapped by
officials of the Chinese legation who intended to return him to
China to face charges. No single event ever brought Sun more
publicity than this. His dramatic escape and the book he wrote on
his imprisonment focused the world's attention on him and on the
situation in China.
After the kidnapping, Sun traveled for two years throughout
Europe studying political systems and formulating his own ideol-
ogy. He became familiar with the tenets of liberalism, socialism,
Marxism, and Darwinism and observed the principles of democ-
racy at work in the United States and Europe.15 The development
of Sun's thinking and the Western influences on it are evident in
various statements made during these early revolutionary years.16
During his two years of travel and study, Sun continued to
refine his political ideas, and he outlined for the first time his
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Three People's Principles, which became the revolution's guiding
light. These principles were: nationalism, democracy, and social-
ism. Sun saw these as the cure to China's ills. In practical terms,
they translated into three goals: the overthrow of the Manchus,
the establishment of a republic, and an equitable economy based
on socialism.
Sun obviously was not an original political philosopher but a
pragmatist who saw China's problems clearly and would modify
his ideology to deal with them. From the West, and the United
States in particular, Sun borrowed much that he believed would
benefit China. As he once emphasized in a speech: "Our only
hope for happiness lies in the revolutionary party . . . , because
the party is willing and ready to adopt the ways and ideas of the
West. We should look at America."17
Yet Sun did not honor all that he found in America or the West.
His adoption of socialism as his third principle resulted from the
inequality he witnessed in the United States and England. He
concluded that "commensurate with the growth of economic
power of the countries, is the growth of the misery of the peo-
ple."18 He therefore rejected capitalism as an option for China,
believing that it would enslave the population.
In 1904, Sun published his revolutionary ideas in New York in
an article titled, "The True Solution to the Chinese Question." A
law student at Yale University, Wang Ch'ung-hui, helped him
with the draft.19 This was more than an appeal to the American
people, for in it, Sun expressed his grievances with the Manchu
regime and summarized his plan for revolution. The whole docu-
ment was constructed so that American democratic principles and
requests for aid were carefully interwoven and almost insepara-
ble. The effect was striking: it was made to seem impossible not to
support Sun if one believed in democratic principles. This was
exactly Sun's intention, and it illustrates why ideology was vital to
his fund-raising efforts. He concluded the article with a metaphor
that was meant to stir Americans:
In order to make sure of our success, to facilitate our movement, to
avoid unnecessary sacrifice and to prevent misunderstanding and
intervention of foreign powers [we] must appeal to the people of
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the United States in particular for your sympathy and support,
either moral or material, because you are pioneers of western civi-
lization in Japan; because you are a Christian nation; because we
intend to model our new government after yours; and above all
because you are the champion of liberty and democracy. We hope
to find many Lafayettes among you.20
Sun thus began his search for "Lafayettes," for it would be indi-
viduals with his type of commitment to principle and action who
would be useful to Sun and his revolutionary movement.
ON THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION
In analyzing Sun Yat-sen's fund-raising techniques, it is easy to
become preoccupied with money. Yet there were many things nec-
essary to revolution that money could not buy. Primary among
these were the numerous "neutral" benefactors who for one rea-
son or another supported Sun or his cause. Without these individ-
uals, Sun would never have escaped from the Chinese legation in
London and would have been virtually helpless in many foreign
countries. Literally hundreds of people aided Sun at one point or
another during his career as a professional revolutionary. One
example may help broaden appreciation of the importance of this
source of support.
Francis W. Damon had long been known as a friend of the Chi-
nese community in Hawai'i. As superintendent of Chinese mis-
sion work for the Hawaiian Evangelical Association since 1881, he
had, along with his wife Mary Happer Damon, helped found a
Chinese hospital, a school for Chinese boys, a Chinese Student
Association, and numerous other organizations.21 It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that Damon befriended the bright, young Sun
when he came to Hawai'i. Their friendship grew, and at one
point, when Sun had to leave Hawai'i quickly, Damon advanced
him $300.22
After the failure of the Canton revolt, the revolutionaries con-
cluded that they needed more military training. Damon offered
his home on Chaplain Lane as a training ground, and twice a
week the revolutionaries practiced marching on his property.23
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When Sun passed through Hawai'i for the last time, in 1910, a
banquet was held in his honor at which Damon presided, "for he
was in sympathy with the aims of Dr. Sun."24
After the success of the 1911 revolution, Sun wrote to Damon to
express his appreciation. "I am glad to know," wrote Sun,
that the realization of my object in liberating China from the
thraldom of the Manchus has given pleasure to my many foreign
friends, and while at this I must not be oblivious to the fact that
you have all along cheered and assisted me in my efforts to bring
this great movement to a success. To you then I reiterate my
thanks and for the many kindnesses you have shown me and mem-
bers of my party.25
Damon's support of Sun's activity must have been of great per-
sonal comfort to Sun. As a Christian, he held certain beliefs that
often conflicted with his acts as a revolutionary. For a religious
man to support violence against tyranny was indeed a progressive
stance only very recently recognized and legitimized by the
church.
Indeed, it was through the aid of friends and supporters like
Damon that Sun was able to travel about the United States.
When he entered the country in 1904, 1909, and 1911, he did so in
spite of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which had been in effect since
1882. This he accomplished by claiming American citizenship on
the basis of a fraudulently obtained Hawaiian birth certificate
attesting to his having been born on O'ahu on November 24, 1870.
The application for the birth certificate included affidavits sub-
mitted by several local supporters. After some initial difficulty in
1904, Sun's claim to citizenship was accepted, and he was thereaf-
ter able to travel freely throughout the United States.26
Exiled to Japan, Sun was forced to reorganize, and here, too,
he enjoyed the assistance of countless benefactors. So overwhelm-
ing was their support that Sun adopted Japan as his chief base of
operations and resided there for six years during his revolutionary
career. This was longer than he stayed in any other nation, and it
paid off financially.27 During his longest stay in Japan, from 1897
to 1902, Sun conducted his most daring and potentially dangerous
ploy to secure funds and support for the revolution.
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Motivated by the lofty principles of freedom and equality, Sun
naturally enough was willing to help people other than Chinese
who were in a similar predicament. It did not go unnoticed, of
course, that these arrangements promised potential financial and
strategic gains for Sun's own movement.
For example, it was difficult in 1899 to ignore the imperialist
actions of the United States in the Philippines, and Sun violently
condemned those actions. He warmly received Mariano Ponce, a
representative of the Philippine national movement, and the two
became friends. Together they organized a system that enabled
Sun and his forces to aid the Aguinaldo government in its struggle
against the United States.
At first, Sun acted as a middleman in the supply of arms to the
Philippines, and it is likely that he received a commission. Soon, a
sense of Asian community developed, and Sun and Ponce agreed
that they would fight for each other's movements. First, Sun's
forces would join the struggle for Philippine independence, and if
that succeeded, the Philippines would aid in the overthrow of the
Ch'ing dynasty.
This was a bold and well-conceived plan, but neither man was
adequately equipped to play power politics. The first shipload of
arms to the Philippines was swallowed by the sea off Shanghai.
Sun tried to organize another shipment, but the United States
forced Japan to halt the movement of all military supplies to the
Philippines. Unable to equip the Filipinos with the necessary
weapons, Sun was preparing a group of Hsing-chung-hui mem-
bers for combat in the Philippines when news arrived of the
United States' victory there.28
In proposing to cross swords with the United States, Sun took a
great risk, but he was blinded by the bright prospects of the Phil-
ippines as a strategic base for fighting the Manchus. Had
Aguinaldo's army posted a victory, Sun would have reaped enor-
mous financial support, and the Chinese revolution might have
progressed much more rapidly. As it was, Sun was given $100,000
by the defeated Aguinaldo government, and he learned much in
his attempt to finance his own activities by associating with for-
eign governments.29
In the summer of 1905, Sun returned to Japan after his travels
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in Europe had enabled him to solidify his revolutionary ideology.
After meeting with sympathizers in Tokyo, he determined that a
new revolutionary organization was needed. At this time, he met
Huang Hsing, who became a leading figure in the revolution, and
together, in August, they formed the T'ung-meng-hui (United
League), an amalgamation of several revolutionary societies.
Based on the ideology of Sun's Three People's Principles, the
T'ung-meng-hui became the most powerful of all Chinese rev-
olutionary parties. As vice president, Huang directed military
affairs, while Sun assumed the duties of president as was responsi-
ble for finances.30 It was under the auspices of the T'ung-meng-
hui that Sun employed some of his most successful and creative
fund-raising schemes.
Initially, Sun continued with the same methods he adopted
when he formed the Hsing-chung-hui. Dues were always the first
source of money. Almost as a matter of pride, the revolutionaries
looked to themselves first for money, and only after exhausting
that source did they search elsewhere. Admission dues, yearly
dues, a contribution based on five to ten percent of one's annual
income, and finally a "special donation" were expected from all
members. The amounts and methods of collection varied from
branch to branch, but the sense of individual commitment was
accepted by most members. In fact, even when on assignment for
the T'ung-meng-hui, members refused to ask for money to cover
their expenses and used personal funds.31
Dues and remittances from members could not go far in fund-
ing the armed insurrections that were the T'ung-meng-hui's
major expense. Though membership comprised nearly 10,000
individuals by 1911, the core of the group consisted of students and
others who were not very wealthy.32 Even in America, the T'ung-
meng-hui was mainly supported by teachers, students, and small
merchants.33 Yet it was the support of these members that enabled
Sun to travel and bear the cost that the grander projects would
necessitate.
One constant source of funds was the issue of revolutionary
bonds. The idea behind them was intriguing, and it reflected not
only Sun's confidence in himself and his movement but also the
influence of the Western capitalist countries upon him. Sun issued
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many bonds for different prices in different countries, but they
essentially worked he same way. The basic idea was that a bond
would be sold for a set price, determined by Sun. Sun promised to
buy these bonds back upon establishment of a Chinese republic at
a price agreed upon at the time of the sale. Obviously, Sun was
offering substantial returns, and this created the incentive to buy
the bonds. C. Martin Wilbur noted that one of the earliest exam-
ples of this type of financing occurred in Hong Kong in 1895. The
Hsing-chung-hui was selling "shares" for $10 in silver with the
understanding that the Chinese republic, once established, would
purchase them for $100.34
By 1905, Sun was issuing bonds for the specific purpose of a sin-
gle uprising. In Singapore, he needed to raise $2,000,000 for a
revolt, so he attempted to sell $1,000 bonds for $250 each. In this
case, he promised to repay the bearer over a five-year period after
the formation of a republic.35
The sale of revolutionary bonds was not limited to Asia, and
when Sun traveled through Europe he was just as zealous in his
salesmanship. Before going to France in 1906, Sun had boxes of
bonds printed. Inscribed in English and French, these bonds were
signed by Sun and promised the usual high returns. The English
side of the bond read:
The Chinese Revolutionary Government
promises to pay the bearer
One hundred dollars
after one year of its establishment
in China on demand at the Treasury
of the said Government in Canton or
its agents abroad
1st January 1906
The President
Sun Wen36
Sun not only used these bonds to raise money but also in place
of money when he could. On at least two occasions in 1907, he
issued bonds to soldiers who had fought for the T'ung-meng-
hui.37 This both saved the organization money and confirmed
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that the soldiers were not mercenaries but revolutionaries who
fought with purpose and goal in mind.
Sun was disappointed with the sales of his revolutionary bonds,
as he rarely came close to the goals he set. In fact, a year after
issuing the revolutionary bonds to the T'ung-meng-hui soldiers,
he wrote: "In more than ten years, our party has never encoun-
tered such a desperate shortage of money. . . . I have just
received a letter from our headquarters at Hanoi saying that if we
do not get 100,000 dollars soon, we will not be able to go on."38
Sun was able to go on, of course, and this can be attributed to the
constant innovation he brought to the task of securing money.
Sun correctly perceived that one aversion to purchasing bonds
was that the buyer would immediately be branded a revolution-
ary. To some this did not matter, but many of the overseas Chi-
nese still had relatives in China and could not afford to be tainted,
for the Manchus often retaliated by razing their property and
executing family members.39
To protect endangered Chinese, Sun conceived various fronts
to issue bonds under names other than that of the Chinese repub-
lic. One of the first such examples was the Company for Promo-
tion of Chinese People's Affairs, and payment was promised by
the Kwangtung Bureau for Soliciting Loans. This ploy ended
with some success, as numerous sympathizers in Tokyo bought
these bonds and promised to encourage their relatives in Indo-
china to do the same. Sun himself traveled to Southeast Asia in
1905 to try to sell more of these bonds.40
Sun realized that the usefulness of deceptive fronts was not lim-
ited to the sale of bonds, and he fashioned numerous other facades
to conceal revolutionary activities. A year before the successful
uprising of 1911, Sun was recruiting support and money in Penang
but found the government interfering in his activities. After a
rousing speech in which he urged everyone to support his cause,
he informed his audience that "to avoid interference by the local
government authorities, we shall go and collect money in the
name of the Chinese educational fund."41 Even in the United
States, on the eve of the revolution, Sun and members of the
T'ung-meng-hui acquired control of the Red Cross in San Fran-
cisco and sought funds through it. This was Sun's most respect-
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able and successful front, and the T'ung-meng-hui reported that
"money began to pour in."42
With each failed revolt prior to the eventual success of 1911, the
money that Sun and the T'ung-meng-hui had raised vanished,
and they had to begin their quest for funds anew. This constant
pressure to raise more money led Sun to offer certain concessions.
Many were harmless, but others directly opposed the principles
for which Sun was fighting.
The T'ung-meng-hui was in grim financial shape in 1908. In a
desperate attempt to extract money from a wealthy merchant in
Kuala Lumpur, Sun instructed the T'ung-meng-hui in Singapore
to approach him in this manner:
First move him by the importance of our cause. If that is not suc-
cessful, then move him with the rewards that will come out of his
investment. . . . But there is one more argument, the argument of
friendship and sentiment. You all know him very well and are very
close friends. Then you must use your friendship to persuade
him. . . . If he does not give us this 100,000 dollars, then we prom-
ise him the monopoly rights to all the mineral resources of the
province of Yunnan for ten years.43
This was a rather extensive promise, and its implications cannot
be ignored, especially since it was not an isolated offer. The pre-
vious fall, Sun had guaranteed that after the establishment of his
government he would personally see that generous donors would
"be given special privilege to open up the country and to exploit
its natural resources. These rewards," he continued, "may attract
others who are not members of the party."44
Marius Jansen has pointed out that Sun even systemized a
series of concessions based on the amount one gave. An invest-
ment of 100 yuan secured one citizenship in the new republic; an
investment of 1,000 yuan resulted in mining and business prefer-
ences; and 10,000yuan bought a government office for a term. For
100,000yuan a donor would be immortalized with a bronze statue,
and for 1,000,000 yuan one's bronze statue would stand in a park
named after the generous patron. Citizenship was even further
differentiated into three classes, and one's class membership was
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determined by when one joined the revolutionary movement.45
The implication was clear: those who joined the movement early
would be preferred citizens and would enjoy privileges that later
supporters would not.
The conflicts in Sun's goals and methods are apparent. He was
desperately fighting to overthrow the oppressive Manchu regime
in order to establish a republic, but, in doing so, he would make
concessions that were most undemocratic. As a fund raiser he was
willing to sell preferential citizenship, government offices, special
business privileges, and even monopoly rights, all to acquire
more money. Yet as the ideological leader of the revolution, Sun
stressed that political reform would be founded on the ideals of
freedom and equality. Specifically, he pledged universal suffrage,
an equal distribution of land according to the tenets of socialism,
and the banning of all monopolies.46 How, one might ask, could a
leader of Sun's stature create such a broad dichotomy between his
actions and his ideals?
It is a difficult question to answer and one with which Sun him-
self did not help historians. It is reasonable to assume that Sun
realized what he was doing and consciously chose to proceed with
these concessions. For Sun believed that the overthrow of the
Ch'ing dynasty was paramount and that ideological consider-
ations of what would replace it had to be secondary. He was will-
ing to compromise certain principles or ideals, believing that in
doing so he would better insure the achievement of his first objec-
tive. The argument has a basic intuitive appeal, and Sun must
have used it to justify his actions. For one thing did remain cer-
tain. If the Manchus remained in control of China, Sun would
not be able to implement the policies to which he had dedicated
his life.
Also fundamental to Sun's support network was his relation-
ship to Chinese secret societies. The very nature of secret societies
precluded the detailed recording of events, but Sun's association
with one such organization—the Hung-men, formed in 1674 and
also known as the Triads—was so extensive that adequate records
do exist to reconstruct many of his dealings with them.47 Sun
treasured this association, for the Hung-men gave generously to
his party, and in 1911 it merged with the T'ung-meng-hui, creating
a united organization.48
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Sun first became associated with the Hung-men in 1903, when
he joined the Ket On Society, the Hung-men organization in
Hawai'i. His motives were a bit devious, for though the Hung-
men was committed to the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty, it
also favored the restoration of the Ming dynasty. Sun opposed
this, but he joined the society in order to tap its financial
resources. Strategically, it was a sound move, for Hung-men
members were committed to aiding each other, and Sun took full
advantage of this.49 In fact, Sun's stature was such that, after his
initiation into the organization, he was promoted to marshal, the
second highest position in the society.50
In 1904, Sun sailed to San Francisco, the headquarters for the
Hung-men in America. Using the authority invested in him in
Honolulu, he convinced leaders of the society to let him rewrite its
constitution. Sun produced a constitution of 80 articles that over-
night converted the Hung-men into a revolutionary group with
goals mirroring those of the T'ung-meng-hui.
Needless to say, Sun attempted to extract money from Hung-
men members. Article 62b of the constitution stipulated that all
members had to reregister each year by sending $1.00 to the head
office. The potential contributions were enormous since the
organization had one hundred thousand members.51
Sun's most lucrative contact with the Hung-men occurred in
Canada on the eve of the 1911 Chinese revolution. On four consec-
utive nights, Sun addressed audiences of more than 1,000. He
devised with local Hung-men members a scheme in which they
could harness this enthusiastic support and turn it into concrete
funds. They decided that Sun would give an exceptionally pas-
sionate speech at the Heng-men headquarters in Victoria and
leave the auditorium directly after finishing it. Playing on the
emotional high that Sun would have created, Hung-meng leaders
would suggest that they mortgage the society's building and offer
the money to Sun. This strategy paid off, as the organization
wholeheartedly supported the idea and agreed to give the money
to Sun.52
Sun brilliantly manipulated this support and created a band-
wagon effect in the rest of Canada. Soon Hung-men societies in
Montreal and Toronto mortgaged their buildings, and a few
wealthy merchants donated generously to the cause. Much of the
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groundwork had been laid for Sun, but he certainly was the inspi-
ration that triggered this financial windfall. This effort enabled
Sun to send $70,000 to the T'ung-meng-hui office in Hong Kong,
and this money was primarily responsible for funding the revolt in
April 1911.53
A few months after the Canadian venture, Sun devised yet
another fund-raising project through the Hung-men. With
$1,000,000 as his goal, Sun proposed the formation of a Chinese
Industrial Company and intended to sell 10,000 shares of stock for
$100 a share. He envisioned a company headquarters in San Fran-
cisco with offices eventually opening in other cities. His major
pitch was that the company would be given monopoly mining
rights in China for ten years, and therefore the stockholders
would directly benefit. Sun, however, could not convince the
Hung-men members, and without their support he could not
form the company.54
Although Sun chose socialism as one of the fundamental princi-
ples of the Chinese future he envisioned, he readily employed the
capitalist tools such as mortgages, bonds, stocks, and loans in his
fund raising for the T'ung-meng-hui. While in the United States
he conceived a plan to monopolize the export of Malay tin. In let-
ters to T'ung-meng-hui leaders, Sun described the plan and
urged that all Chinese owners of tin mines form a syndicate to
control tin exports. Sun had arranged with a broker in New York
an import contract pending the guarantee that Malaya would sell
the United States at least half of its exported tin. It was a shrewd
plan, for it would take control of the price of tin away from the
British, who had previously administered its export from Malaya.
Not only would Sun gain a sizeable commission, but Chinese
exporters would increase their profits. The syndicate was never
formed, however, and the project had to be abandoned. The Chi-
nese exporters were vaguely ambivalent, and the T'ung-meng-
hui was unable to convince them of the monopoly's merits.55
During the 16 years that Sun was collecting funds for the revo-
lution, the overseas Chinese, especially those in Southeast Asia,
were his most important resource.56 Systematically declared per-
sona non grata by Asian governments, Sun himself found it increas-
ingly difficult to tap this source himself. Thus he entrusted fund
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raising among overseas Chinese in Asia to other T'ung-meng-hui
leaders while he traveled to the West. This was the background
that led to Sun's most ambitious and complex financial scheme.
As a result of a series of letters and meetings, Sun was united
with four very different men. Homer Lea was a Stanford gradu-
ate, military enthusiast, and a hunchback whose personality was
as unusual as his posture. Charles Boothe was a former New York
banker forced into retirement because of ill health. W. W. Allen
was a successful Wall Street financier and childhood friend of
Boothe. Last, there was Yung Wing, a Yale graduate and elderly
reformist leader living in Connecticut. Together, these men
formed an American syndicate in March 1910 and drew up a
detailed plan to overthrow the Manchus. The whole project
involved more than $10,000,000 dollars. Sun naturally took the
office of president and commanded the whole proceeding. Lea
was the "commanding general" in charge of all military opera-
tions. Boothe became the "sole foreign agent" and was responsi-
ble for much of the overall coordination of their activities. Allen
was the essential contact with Wall Street money, and Yung acted
as the mediator between the revolutionary groups in the United
States and those in Asia.57
These five men acted out an intriguing plot to finance a revolu-
tion. Offering concessions similar to those already mentioned,
Sun and his entourage came surprisingly close to pulling off this
deal. Early on, Lea had raised more than $1,000,000 dollars in
cash and had obtained promises of another $1,000,000.58 In Feb-
ruary 1909, Allen was confident that he had found a group that
would lend the revolutionaries the needed cash.59 In reality, the
money never materialized. Allen did meet with J. P. Morgan,
American financier, a number of times, but Morgan could not be
convinced. A Morgan representative gave at least one reason for
not offering the loan: "I am ready to do business with any estab-
lished government on earth but I cannot . . . make a government
to do business with."60
Sun was undeniably disappointed with the outcome. He had
once even told Lea that "all our hopes are pinned on the Ameri-
can plan."61 This was certainly not the case, however, for Sun had
other ideas for obtaining a large loan and was involved in nego-
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tiating a series of credit schemes. One of Sun's methods of obtain-
ing a loan was to arrange for a unique system of collateral. In
attempting to get a loan of £500,000 from an English bank, Sun
offered as guarantors a Chinese bank, three rice mills in Bangkok,
three mine owners in Malaya, and some Singapore merchants.
He calculated their cumulative property to be worth £4,000,000.62
This was an ingenious way of taking advantage of T'ung-meng-
hui members and other supporters who had businesses but were
unable to provide cash.
Sun regularly and successfully adapted his approach to suit his
audience. In attempting to obtain credit from banks, Sun was
business-like, confident, and direct; he wasted little time on ideo-
logical matters that were irrelevant to a bank. The following
exchange with a Japanese banker illustrates Sun's manner and
even his sense of humor:
Sun: You're in with the Mitsui money bags; get me some money.
Mitsui executive: About how much?
Sun: The more the better.
Mitsui executive: What's the most you would want?
Sun: One or two hundred million yen would do.
Undoubtedly there was much more to the negotiation, but his
passage reflects Sun's self-assurance and candid approach. The
Mitsui bank did, in fact, lend Sun money in 1911. It was not the
millions that Sun requested, but 150,000 yen at 8.25 percent per
annum.63
Sun once even negotiated a loan in which the relative military
success of the T'ung-meng-hui army was used as collateral. Hav-
ing captured the strategic Chen-nan pass in the fourth revolt, Sun
arranged a loan of 20,000,000 Hong Kong dollars with a French
banker. If the army could advance and hold Lung-chou, a city in
Kwangsi, the French bank would forward the first part of the
loan. Ch'ing forces, however, recaptured the pass on December
9, 1907, and the Frenchman withdrew his offer. This was but one
example of Sun's persistent efforts to obtain loans from the
United States, France, and Britain from 1907 until the outbreak of
the revolution.64 In all of these, his methods were similar. Essen-
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tially, he promised high rates of return, concessions, and an imag-
inative array of collateral.
Along with the sale of revolutionary bonds, monopolizing
efforts, and flirtations with foreign governments, Sun regularly
practiced the most basic of fund-raising techniques: direct solici-
tation. Whether asking Charles Boothe for a personal donation of
$50,000 or a laborer for the change from his pocket, Sun never
failed to state his case briefly and ask for a donation.65 Personally,
he led by example, as he donated all of his savings from his medi-
cal practice to the first revolutionary effort.66 Sun's brother, Sun
Mei, was the revolution's most generous patron. Aside from giv-
ing more than $750,000 during the revolutionary period, Sun Mei
was responsible for Sun's education and the care of his family
while he was abroad.67 In Japan, Southeast Asia, and Hawai'i,
Sun enjoyed the backing of a few affluent sympathizers. These
were men he could be totally frank with and ask directly for the
amount of money he needed. If they could supply it, they
usually did.68
Wealthy revolutionaries were not commonplace, however.
Sun, for the most part, was supported by the middle and lower
classes, and they gave generously, considering their means.69 One
of the most poignant examples occurred in Hanoi, where Huang
Ching-Nan, a poor bean seller, donated his life savings to the rev-
olution. "Others are risking and sacrificing their lives," he said.
"The giving away of my property is nothing compared with what
others are doing for the sake of the people."70 Perhaps this bean
seller hit upon the reason for the success of the revolution. For it
was this selfless attitude, emanating from Sun and spreading
throughout the whole movement, that enabled Sun and the
T'ung-meng-hui to finance the revolution that brought down the
Ch'ing dynasty.
With the establishment of the Republic of China after the 1911
revolution, those who had contributed through bonds and other
measures became creditors. Exactly what action was taken by the
new republic to honor its debts is unclear. One writer concluded
that Sun defaulted on his debts, including all loans and revolu-
tionary bonds, but notes that Chung Yu (Chung-Kun Ai), a
Hawai'i businessman, was reimbursed.71 In fact, in his autobiog-
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raphy, Chung claimed that the republic paid him $1,000 for each
of the two $50 revolutionary bonds he purchased from Sun.72
Schiffrin insisted that Sun conducted "his financial transactions
in a business-like way, and took his debts seriously," although he
failed to cite any examples of the republic repaying debts.73 And
finally, Wilbur disclosed that Sun did make certain provisions to
insure that the revolutionary creditors would be repaid. It is not
known to what extent these were effected.74
A MODEL FUND RAISER
In 1932, Lyman Pierce published a book titled How to Raise Money,
which distilled his decades of experience raising large sums for
organizations such as the American Red Cross, the Young Men's
Christian Association, and the Boy Scouts.75 Pierce described a
method of fund raising that had become known as the ward sys-
tem. "This method," he contended, "is now accepted and used
by practically every campaign bureau in existence and by every
agency and group of agencies which is successfully meeting its
financial requirements."76 In short, by 1930, this was the most
modern and accepted method for raising money. It was based on 11
principles that were considered essential for a successful cam-
paign. Pierce listed these as:
1. An appealing case
2. Competent agency management
3. A reasonable objective
4. A friendly well-informed constituency
5. Timeliness
6. Numerous points of contact
7. An unhurried period of preparation
8. An adequate scale of giving
9. Substantial preliminary gifts
10. Tested methods
11. Competent direction.77
Sun did not have these eleven principles, nor the text that elab-
orated on them. Yet it appears that in practice he followed similar
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guidelines, for his methods of fund raising to finance the Chinese
revolution were almost identical to those of the ward system. It is
not difficult to draw parallels. The appealing case was, in Sun's
words, the emancipation of his miserable countrymen from the
cruel Tartar yoke.78 Competent agency management was pro-
vided by the T'ung-meng-hui, and the objective was the neces-
sary funds to topple the Manchu dynasty. The constituency was
T'ung-meng-hui members and other sympathizers, and they kept
up to date through sponsored newspapers. An argument can be
made supporting the timing of the revolution, since there was
widespread dissatisfaction with the inept Manchu rule. The
numerous T'ung-meng-hui branches around the world provided
sufficient contact. And certainly the revolutionaries enjoyed con-
siderable preparation time since there were 16 years between the
first uprising and the triumphant revolt at Wuchang in October
1911. A scale of giving implied trying to get the most out of each
donor, and Sun's numerous fund-raising strategies attested to his
compliance with this principle. Substantial preliminary gifts were
sought through Sun's brother, and he did finance the majority of
the first revolt in Canton as well as the Huichow revolt in 1900.79
Tested methods was the only category that, for understandable
reasons, was difficult to apply to a revolution.
The last factor was considered by far the most important.
"Never was it more true," Pierce stressed, "that other things
being equal, an organization which is being directed by a forceful,
experienced personality is the one which is going to be able to
overcome obstacles through a determined, convinced, and enthu-
siastic organized force."80 Leadership was thus the most vital
component in a fund-raising campaign. Sun provided this leader-
ship just as he provided for the rest of those essential ingredients.
As this comparison shows, the fund-raising campaign Sun
directed employed the same sophisticated principles that had just
begun to be developed in the United States at that time. Though
it is beyond the scope of this essay to analyze the reasons for many
of Sun's fund-raising failures, I would argue that these failures lay
not with Sun's method, but with the pervading political climate in
the countries in which Sun sought funds. For his fund-raising pro-
cedures had advanced beyond contemporary methods, as he
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employed strategies that had yet to be documented. Sun's phe-
nomenal technique for raising money was no less revolutionary,
given the circumstances, than his political goal of establishing a
Republic of China. He therefore deserves much more credit for
financing the Chinese revolution than most historians have been
willing to give him.
It is difficult to ascertain what motivated Sun throughout his
career as a revolutionary. A few days before his death in March
1925, he beckoned K'ung Hsiang-hsi, his brother-in-law, to his
bedside. Grasping both of K'ung's hands, Sun said: "You're a
Christian and so am I. I wish to tell you something I have always
felt which you will understand. Just as Christ was sent by God to
the world, so also did God send me."81 This statement helps
explain many of Sun's previous actions and reflects a key aspect of
his personality. Throughout his childhood and life, Sun had a
keen sense of his own importance. From the breaking of idols in
his hometown, to his submission of self-strengthening proposals
to Ch'ing officials, to his publication of Kidnapped in London, Sun
was often simultaneously trying to gain support and call attention
to himself.82 His dedication to revolution and reform in China
can never be questioned, but in fulfilling this quest, Sun certainly
appeased his blatant egoism, for he saw himself as the rightful and
best leader of revolutionary China.
It is difficult to speculate on the course of the revolution without
Sun. Certainly Wilbur was correct when he noted that "revolu-
tions arise from revolutionary situations as much as from revolu-
tionary leaders."83 Nonetheless, Sun played an indispensable role
in this drama. Ideologically, he contributed the Three People's
Principles and was the first to express the notion of a republic for
China. It was his leadership and organization that coalesced the
secret societies and other small revolutionary groups into the
united front of the T'ung-meng-hui. And he personally spear-
headed the revolutionary financing effort that funded most of the
propaganda and armed revolts against the dynasty. Sun, in
essence, injected the catalyst into the movement that eventually
brought down the dynasty. Without his inspired leadership and
constant fund raising, the dynasty, instead of falling, would have
decomposed slowly until its rotted mass crumbled.
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Arriving back in China on Christmas day, 1911, Sun was a satis-
fied man. For 16 years, he had roamed the globe as an exiled revo-
lutionary so that one day he might be able to return, a free man
among free men. On December 29, 1911, Sun was elected provi-
sional president of the Republic of China, and his lifelong dream
had come true. The dream did not last long. In an effort to facili-
tate a united China, Sun resigned his presidency in favor of Yuan
Shih-k'ai. Yuan, however, was not a republican and betrayed the
very principles he was elected to uphold. Sun later wrote, "I com-
mitted my mistake by entrusting the wrong man, the arch-mur-
derer Yuen."84
In exile again, Sun began in 1914 his "Second Revolution,"
vowing that he would rise up against Yuan. Donning the familiar
role of fund-raiser, Sun used his time-honored methods and
obtained loans from Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union to
fight Yiian's regime.85 Sun was destined to be a revolutionary and
died fighting for the same goals he once thought he had achieved.
The revolution had not been won, and Sun's dying words,
"Peace-Struggle-Save China," were as much a testament to how
he spent his life as they were a command to surviving revolutiona-
ries.86
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